New livestock maps pinpoint ‘danger zones’ for possible spread of deadly H7N9 strain of bird flu

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Feeding poultry in Bangladesh (photo on Flickr by WorldFish).

A recent paper that maps the global distributions of the world’s major livestock species has already been used to advance understanding of where surveillance efforts should be targeted to prevent the possible spread of a lethal bird flu virus now circulating in poultry populations in China, where it has killed 62 people. The original mapping work, led by Tim Robinson, of the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), and published at the end of May, was immediately put to practical use in locating large regions in South and Southeast Asia that would suit the new lethal virus. Ominously, unlike H5N1, a viral strain of bird flu that has killed millions of poultry and at least 359 humans since its first appearance in 1987, H7N9 does not cause severe illness in the chickens it infects, making it much more difficult to detect, and…

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ILRI presents at international workshop on pandemic flu controversies

A woman sells live ducklings in a ‘wet market’ in Indonesia (photo credit: ILRI/Christine Jost).

On 10–11 January 2013, over 50 international experts from science, policy, the media and academia met at Sussex University for a workshop to discuss what recent controversies can teach us about possible future responses to pandemic influenza outbreaks.

The workshop, convened by the Economic & Social Research Council STEPS Centre and the Centre for Global Health Policy, examined in depth why controversies have emerged around pandemic flu, in order to inform future approaches.

Veterinary epidemiologist Jeff Mariner represented the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) at the workshop as an invited panellist speaking on experiences with participatory surveillance in control of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI).

Mariner said that HPAI has largely settled down to become endemic in those countries with dense and complex poultry populations and faded out from countries that were not very well suited to sustained transmission.

“The HPAI control programs had little impact in changing the epidemiological course of evolution of the epidemic, and the response to HPAI to large extent ignored key lessons from previous successful disease control activities,” he observed.

“The emergency response approach led investments to have limited sustained impact as they did not address the fundamental institutional issues and the limited capacity of host-country services to absorb the large amounts of money allocated,” he added.

In conclusion, Mariner proposed that in the future, pandemic preparedness should focus on long-term capacity building rather than short-term emergency responses.

Access the workshop report here